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ABSTRACT
Humans have the ability to report the contents of their subjective experience – we can say to each
other, “I am aware of X”. However, the decision processes that support reports about mental contents
remain poorly understood. In this article I propose a computational framework that characterises
awareness reports as metacognitive decisions (inference) about a generative model of perceptual
content. This account is motivated from the perspective of how flexible hierarchical state spaces
are built during learning and decision-making. Internal states supporting awareness reports, unlike
those covarying with perceptual contents, are simple and abstract, varying along a one-dimensional
continuum from absent to present. A critical feature of this architecture is that it is both higher-
order and asymmetric: there is a vast number of perceptual states is nested under “present”, but a
much smaller number of possible states is nested under “absent”. Via simulations I show that this
asymmetry provides a natural account of observations of “global ignition” in brain imaging studies
of awareness reports.
1 Introduction
Humans have the ability to report the contents of their subjective experience - we can say to each other, “I am aware
of X”. Such reports are intended to convey meaning, and unlike other aspects of behaviour, have contents [1]. This
unique property of reports makes them central to a science of consciousness, which has focused on measuring and
quantifying differences in awareness while holding other aspects of stimuli and behaviour constant [2, 3].
However, the decision processes that support reports about mental contents remain poorly understood. In this article I
propose a computational framework that characterises awareness reports as metacognitive decisions (inference) about
a generative model of perceptual content [4]. This higher-order state space (HOSS) framework builds on Bayesian
approaches to perception that invoke hierarchical probabilistic inference as a route towards efficiently modeling the
external world [5, 6, 7, 8].
The outline of the paper is as follows. First, I start by describing the psychological processes that support reports
with reference to experimental paradigms commonly used to study conscious awareness. Second, I outline the central
hypothesis, that awareness reports reflect a decision about whether a generative model of perceptual contents is repre-
senting signal or noise. Third, I use a toy model of a simple perceptual decision to explicate aspects of the framework,
and distinguish it from other, related approaches such as signal detection theory (SDT; [9, 10]). Finally, I briefly
highlight empirical predictions that flow from the model, and how it relates to existing theories of consciousness such
as global workspace and higher-order theories.
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2 Psychological basis of awareness reports
Several authors have proposed that the psychological basis of a (visual) awareness report is an internal decision about
the visibility of perceptual contents1 [10, 11, 12]. This implies that internal states supporting awareness reports, unlike
those covarying with perceptual contents themselves, are both simple and abstract, varying along a one-dimensional
continuum from unaware to aware. Note that a better terminology for “unaware” is really “absent”, “unseen” or
“noise”, as participants of course remain aware of seeing nothing on trials on which they report “unaware”. Awareness
reports also refer to different subsets of perceptual content: for instance, subjects may be asked “did you see the
word?”, “did you see the number?” or “did you see anything at all?”. These two features imply that awareness reports
are metacognitive decisions about a rich perceptual generative model, rather than a feature of this generative model.
We will make this hypothesis more concrete in the next section.
A range of experimental paradigms have been developed to introduce variability in awareness reports while keeping
other aspects of stimuli and behaviour fixed (see [13] for a review). For example, using backward masking, Dehaene
and colleagues found that they could make words invisible while showing (via priming effects and brain imaging) that
they were processed up to a semantic level [14]. When subjects reported consciously seeing the words, whole-brain
fMRI showed elevated activations in the parietal and prefrontal cortex, which have become known as “global ignition”
responses due to their non-linear response profile in relation to stimulation strength [3, 15].2
3 Hypothesis
In common with other predictive processing approaches, we assume that the brain is engaged in building a hierarchical,
probabilistic generative model of the world, one in which inference and learning proceed using (approximations of)
Bayes’ rule. The novel aspect of the current framework is its focus on report, and explaining how decisions to respond
“I am aware of X” or “I am unaware of X” get made.3
The central hypothesis is:
Awareness reports are decisions about whether our perceptual generative model currently reflects
presence (signal) or absence (noise).
These decisions are governed by a second-order (metacognitive) inference about the state of a first-order (perceptual)
generative model [4]. One way of implementing this second-order inference is by adding an additional hierarchical
state above the perceptual generative model, which we refer to as an “awareness state”. Paralleling the psychological
simplicity of awareness reports, this awareness state is also simple, and signals a probability of whether there is signal
or noise in the lower layers (corresponding to reports of “present” or “absent”). It is also part of the generative model,
such that if the model is run forward, states of presence (vs. absence) lead to the generation of perceptual content in
lower layers.
4 Model
We describe the model formally in terms of a probabilistic graphical model [24], where nodes correspond to unknown
variables and the graph structure is used to indicate dependencies between variables. These graphs provide a concise
description of how sensory data is generated (Figure 1A).
In this model, W is a 1×N vector that encodes the relative probabilities of each of N discrete perceptual states. A is
a scalar awareness state encoding the probability of reporting “presence”. µ is a M ×N vector defining the location
(mean) of a multivariate Gaussian determined by the currently active state in W in a feature space of dimensionality
M . Σ is a M ×M covariance matrix which for simplicity we assume is independent of W .
1The same computational considerations likely hold for awareness of other sensory modalities - a focus on visibility here reflects
a historical bias towards vision in studies of conscious awareness.
2Since these classic studies, alternative explanations of frontoparietal ignition have been put forward, including that it is involved
in the act of reporting, but not conscious awareness, or that it reflects greater performance capacity on conscious trials [16, 17].
These debates are ongoing (see [18, 19], for recent arguments from both sides), but here we put them to one side given that we are
content to seek an explanation of report itself.
3Note that here I am focusing on reportable states of awareness, and leaving aside the issue of whether non-reportable contents
may be conscious [20, 21]. By adopting this stance, we frame a clear question that is answerable by cognitive science: what are the
computational processes involved in a report of awareness? [22, 23]
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Awareness state
Perceptual states
Sensory input
A B
Figure 1. A) Probabilistic graphical model of awareness reports. Nodes represent random variables and the graph
structure is used to indicate dependencies as indicated by directed arrows. The shaded node indicates that this variable
is observed by the system as sensory input. B) Expanded version of the graphical model from panel (A) that makes
explicit the asymmetry in the state space. Figures created using the Daft package in Python.
Note that each “perceptual” state W here is discrete, but in reality this state space is likely to be multidimensional
and also hierarchically organised. w0 is included to simplify the notation, but is a redundant variable that inherits a
copy of a0. When answering the query, “Present or absent?”, the model computes the posterior P (A = a1|X = x),
marginalising over perceptual states W :
P (A = a1|X = x) ∝
∑
W,µ
P (A = a1,W, µ,Σ, X = x)
∝
∑
W,µ
P (A = a1)P (W |A = a1)P (µ|W )P (X = x|µ,Σ)
∝ P (A = a1)
∑
W,µ
P (W |A = a1)P (µ|W )P (X = x|µ,Σ)
(1)
In this architecture, awareness is a higher-order state in a generative model of perceptual contents (Figure 1). As in
standard models of perceptual decision-making, inference on contents W is also straightforward, and may allow the
observer to jointly determine both awareness and contents in response to specific queries.
A critical feature of this architecture is that the state space nested under the awareness state is asymmetric. In the
absence of awareness, there is (by definition) an absence of perceptual content (Figure 1B). In contrast, a vast number
of potential perceptual states is nested under the awareness state of “presence”. This imposes an asymmetry in the
model which we will leverage in the next section when seeking to account for global ignition responses.
4.1 Simulations
To simulate the model I build on previous work using a two-dimensional feature space to capture important features of
multidimensional perceptual categorisation [10]. Each axis represents the strength of activation of one of two possible
stimulus features, such as leftward or rightward tilted grating orientations (see Figure 2). The origin represents low
activation on both features, consistent with no stimulus (or noise) being presented. As in the more general case
described in the previous section, each stimulus category generates samples from a multivariate Gaussian whose mean
3
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Figure 2. A) Two-dimensional feature space for a toy perceptual decision problem involving classifying two possible
stimuli (e.g. left- and right-tilted Gabors). Each Gaussian indicates the likelihood of observing a pair of features (e.g.
orientation) given each stimulus class. The right-tilted stimuli occupy the righthand side of the grid; left-tilted stimuli
occupy lefthand side of the grid. The absence of stimulation is represented by a distribution in which activation of
each feature is low, towards the origin. In two-dimensional signal detection theory (SDT), there are three stimulus
classes organised in a flat (non-hierarchical) structure. B) The same two-dimensional feature space from (A), modified
to make explicit the hierarchical aspect of the higher-order state space (HOSS) model. A higher-order awareness state
(a1) nests perceptual states w1 and w2.
is dominated by one or other feature. Thus if I receive a sample of X = [2 0], I can be confident that I was shown a
left-tilted stimulus; if I receive a sample X = [0 2], I can be confident in seeing a right-tilted stimulus.
King and Dehaene [10] showed that by placing different types of decision criteria onto this space, multiple empiri-
cal relationships between discrimination performance, confidence and visibility could be simulated. In their model,
visibility was modeled as the distance from the origin, and stimulus awareness reflected a first-order (flat) perceptual
categorisation in which “absent” was one of several potential stimulus classes (Figure 2A). Our model builds closely
on theirs and inherits the benefits of being able to accommodate dissociations between forced-choice responding and
subjective reports. However it differs in proposing that awareness is not inherent to perceptual categorisation; instead,
perceptual categorisation is nested under a generative model of awareness (Figure 2B)). In other words, unlike in SDT,
deciding that a stimulus is “absent” in the HOSS model is governed by a more abstract state than deciding a stimulus is
tilted to the left or right. We will see that this seemingly minor change in architecture leads to important consequences
for the relationship between awareness and global ignition.
To explore the properties of the model we simulate inference at different levels of the hierarchy for the two-class
stimulus discrimination problem described in Figure 2B (where µ = [0.5 1.5], [1.5 0.5] or [0.5 0.5] and Σ is the
identity matrix). We first simulate, for a variety of two-dimensional inputs (X’s), the probability of saying “aware” or
“seen” (P (A = a1|X = x)). Figure 3A shows that this probability rises in a graded manner from the lower left corner
of the graph (low activation of any feature) to the upper right (high activation of both features). In contrast, confidence
in making a discrimination response (e.g. rightward vs. leftward) increases away from the major diagonal (Figure
3B), as the model becomes sure that the sample was generated by either a leftward or rightward tilted stimulus. As in
[10], these changes in discrimination confidence may still occur in the absence of reporting “seen”.
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A B
Figure 3. Simulations of inference on A) awareness state A and B) perceptual states W , as a function of sensory input
X . In panel (A) the posterior probability of a report of “presence” rises from the lower left to the upper right of the
grid. In panel (B) confidence in stimulus identify (e.g. left- or right-tilted Gabor) increases towards the corners of the
grid. Overlaid in white is the 0.5 contour from panel (A) showing that graded changes in confidence in identity still
occur on trials that have a high likelihood of being classed as “unseen” by the model.
We next simulate a proxy for prediction error at each layer in the model – in other words, how much belief change was
induced by the sensory sample. We use the Kullback-Leibler (K-L) divergence as a compact summary of how far the
posterior probability distribution at each level in the network differs from the prior. The K-L divergence is a measure
of Bayesian surprise at each level in the network, which under predictive coding accounts is linked to neural activation
at each level in a hierarchical network [5, 25]. Thus computing K-L divergence in the network provides a rough proxy
for the amount of “activation” we would expect as a function of different types of decision.
At the level of perceptual states W , there is substantial asymmetry in the K-L divergence expected when the model
says “seen” vs. “unseen” (Figure 4A). This is due to the large belief updates invoked in the perceptual layer W by
samples that deviate from the origin. In contrast, when we compute K-L divergence for the awareness state (Figure
4B), the level of prediction error is symmetric across seen and unseen decisions. This is because at this level there is
minimal asymmetry between inference on presence and absence. When simulating these belief updates over a range
of precisions to mimic increasing stimulus-onset asynchrony in a typical backward-masking experiment, we see that
the asymmetry in K-L divergence of the W states increases with SOA, producing an ignition-like pattern when the
stimulus is “seen” (Figure 4C).
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Figure 4. A, B) Kullback-Leibler (K-L) divergence for A) perceptual states W and B) awareness state A as a function
of sensory input X . K-L divergence quantifies the change from prior to posterior after seeing the stimulus X , and
provides a metric for the magnitude of belief update at different levels of the network. The lower panels show the
averaged K-L divergence for both W and A as a function of whether the model reports presence (P (A = a1|X =
x) > 0.5) or absence. The network nodes correspond to those in Figure 1A and the orange node indicates the node for
which the K-L divergence is calculated. C) Behaviour of the network in a simulated masking experiment at various
levels of stimulus-onset asynchrony (SOA, modeled as increasing sensory precision) in which sensory evidence was
sampled from the three stimulus classes shown in Figure 1B. The lefthand panel shows that the model is more likely
to report “seen” as SOA increases. The middle panel shows the K-L divergence at the level of perceptual statesW as a
function of whether the model reports presence (P (A = a1|X = x) > 0.5) or absence. The expected K-L divergence
is asymmetric, with a bigger average belief update following “seen” decisions which may be a computational correlate
of global ignition. The righthand panel shows the average KL divergence of awareness state A as a function of
whether the model reports presence (P (A = a1|X = x) > 0.5) or absence. At this level the expected K-L divergence
is relatively symmetric for “seen” and “unseen” decisions.
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5 Empirical predictions
The model is currently situated at a computational level and remains agnostic about temporal dynamics and neural
implementation4. Here I instead focus on coarser-scale predictions about the neural correlates of awareness reports in
typical consciousness experiments.
First, as hinted above, an asymmetric state space for presence and absence suggests there will be greater summed
prediction error in the entire network on presence decisions (as summarised by K-L divergence at each node of W ).
This may be a computational correlate of the global ignition responses often found to track awareness reports [3, 15].
Second, the model predicts that awareness reports (but not discrimination performance, which relies on lower-order
inference on W ) will depend on higher-order states. These may be instantiated in neural populations in prefrontal and
parietal cortex [28]. Thus it may be possible to silence or otherwise inactivate the neural substrates of an awareness
state without affecting performance – a type of blindsight [29, 30]. However, to the extent that this network is flexible
in its functional contribution to higher cognition, showing both “multiple demand” characteristics [31] and mixed
selectivity [32], we should also not be surprised by null results, given that single lesions may belie redundancy in its
contribution to awareness [19].
Third, for the uppermost awareness state, we expect symmetry – decisions in favour of both presence and absence
will lead to belief updates of similar magnitude. There has been limited focus on examining decisions about stimulus
absence (as these decisions are often used as a baseline or control condition in studies of perceptual awareness).
However, existing data are compatible with symmetric encoding of presence and absence at the upper level of the visual
hierarchy, in primate lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC; [33]). Merten and Nieder [34] trained monkeys to report the
presence or absence of a variety of low-contrast shapes presented near to visual threshold. Neural activity tracking the
decision (present or absent) was decorrelated from that involved in planning a motor response by use of a post-stimulus
cue that varied from trial to trial (Figure 5). Distinct neural populations tracked the decision to report “seen” vs.
“unseen”. Importantly the magnitude of activation of these populations was similar in timing and strength, suggesting
a symmetric encoding of awareness in LPFC. Using fMRI, Christensen et al. also observed symmetric activation
for judgments of presence and absence (compared to an intermediate visibility rating) in anterior prefrontal cortex,
whereas a global ignition response was seen for presence (compared to absence) in a widespread frontoparietal/striatal
network [35].
More broadly, the current framework suggests that focusing on inference about absence will be particularly fruitful for
understanding the neural and computational basis of awareness reports [34, 36, 37, 38, 39].
4For recent work translating probabilistic graphical models into models of neuronal message passing see [26, 27].
decisions on the discharge rates of the neurons. During both
analysis phases, we found a proportion of neurons significantly
coding the subjective judgments of monkeys about the stimulus
presence or absence [Fig. 2B; 8% (58/708) during the stimulus
phase and 18% (128/708) during the delay phase, P < 0.05, SLR
analysis]. A proportion of 14% of the cells (96/708) during the
stimulus phase and 15% of the neurons (106/708) during the
delay phase only coded the intensity of the stimulus (P < 0.05,
SLR analysis). Only 1% and 3% of the recorded neurons were
modulated by both the factors stimulus intensity and the sub-
jective decision during the stimulus and delay phase, respectively
(Fig. 2B). Neurons significantly covarying with the monkey’s
choices were termed “decision neurons.” Overall, we found
a significantly higher proportion of decision neurons in the delay
phase compared with the stimulus phase, (P < 0.01; χ2 test).
Receiver operating characteristics (ROC) analysis was used to
quantify the probability with which the decision of the monkey
could be predicted from the neuronal responses. Choice proba-
bility indices were calculated for “yes” decisions in clearly visible,
salient stimulus trials (hits) versus “no” decisions in stimulus-
absent trials (correct rejections), as well as for “yes” (hits) versus
“no” (misses) decisions in threshold trials when stimuli were
presented close to the perceptual threshold.
Neuronal selectivity of a given neuron is usually determined
by the experimental condition that elicits the highest discharge
rate. This approach ignores that suppressive effects (decreases in
firing rates relative to baseline discharge) are sometimes the
dominant influences of a particular stimulus. Thus, we sub-
divided and classified decision neurons according to their active
modulation of neuronal activity (modulation strength) during
“yes” or “no” decisions rather than highest discharge rate.
Neurons modulating (increasing or decreasing) their firing rates
more strongly for “yes” decisions were termed “yes” neurons,
cells modulating their discharges more strongly to “no” decision
were called “no” neurons.
“Yes” Neurons Actively Encode Decisions During the Stimulus Phase.
During the stimulus phase, virtually all decision neurons (98%)
modulated their discharge rates only for “yes” judgments (merely
one neuron was classified as a “no” cell; summary in Table S1).
Fig. 3A shows an exemplary “yes” cell that increased its discharge
rates for hits in salient stimulus trials, whereas the firing rates for
correct rejections in stimulus-absent trials remained at baseline
level. Neuronal responses for threshold trials correlated signifi-
cantly with the judgment of the monkey: for “yes” decisions,
neurons increased their activity, mirroring the firing rate in salient
stimulus trials. For erroneous “no” decisions (misses), activity
remained at baseline level, just as in stimulus absent trials. The
choice probability indices for salient and threshold trials are
depicted as a function of time in Fig. 3A, Lower. Indices signifi-
cantly above chance level indicate that these discharges of neu-
rons reliably predict the decision of the monkey (P < 0.05; ROC
analysis, bootstrapping). This effect was also present on the
neuronal population level (34 cells; Fig. 3B). Several cells showed
transient suppression of the firing rate for “yes” decisions (Fig.
3C); the neuronal population data (23 units) are depicted in Fig.
3D. The population analysis includes the neuronal responses
during false alarms. Interestingly, decision neurons increased
(Fig. 3B) or decreased (Fig. 3D) the firing rates for this erroneous
“yes” decisions in a similar way as during hit trials, already during
this early decision phase. The average peak latencies of the neu-
ronal responses for false alarms and hits were comparable (neu-
rons increasing the firing rate: hit latency = 242 ms, false alarms
latency = 289 ms; neurons decreasing firing rates: hit latency =
346 ms, false alarms latency = 341 ms). Overall, during the
stimulus phase, PFC neurons represented “yes” decisions by ei-
ther increasing or decreasing their responses, whereas “no”
decisions were represented by default discharge rates.
Fig. 1. Visual detection protocol and behavioral performance. (A) The
monkeys initiated each experimental trial by grasping a lever and fixating
a central fixation target. After 500 ms, a stimulus was displayed for 100 ms in
50% of the trials (intensity varied in nine levels, centered around the per-
ceptual threshold). In the other 50% of the trials, no stimulus was shown.
Both types of trials appeared randomly. After the delay period (2,700 ms),
a color cue appeared to indicate the rule of how to respond to a particular
decision. If a stimulus was presented, a red square cue required the monkey
to release the lever within 1,000 ms to receive a fluid reward, whereas a blue
cue demanded the monkey to keep holding the lever for another 1,200 ms.
The rule applied in the inverse way if no stimulus was presented. Thus,
movement preparation was excluded during the delay period. (B) Signal
detection theory classifies an observer’s behavioral options (hit, miss, correct
rejection, and false alarms) at detection threshold, given two stimulus con-
ditions (stimulus present or absent) and two possible decisions (“yes, stim-
ulus present” and “no, stimulus absent”). (C and D) Psychometric detection
curve for monkey H (C) and monkey M (D). Stimulus intensity is represented
as % visual contrast; visual contrast of 0 indicates absence of stimulus. [Error
bars (SEM) are so small that they are hidden behind the markers].
Fig. 2. Recording sites and proportion of selective cells. (A) Right shows
a top view of a monkey brain. The gray area marks the chamber location.
The circular panels on Left show the precise recording sites inside each re-
cording chamber in the lateral PFC for both monkeys. The proportion of
decision neurons at individual recording sites is color-coded. iar, inferior
arcuate sulcus; ps, principal sulcus; sar, superior arcuate sulcus. (B) Pro-
portions of neurons coding stimulus intensity and decision in both phases.
2 of 6 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1121084109 Merten and Nieder
decisions on the discharge rates of the neurons. During both
analysis phases, we found a proportion of neurons significantly
coding the subjective judgments of monkeys about the stimulus
presence or absence [Fig. 2B; 8% (58/708) during the stimulus
phase and 18% (128/708) during the delay phase, P < 0.05, SLR
analysis]. A proportion of 14% of the cells (96/708) during the
stimulus phase and 15% of the neurons (106/708) during the
delay phase only coded the intensity of the stimulus (P < 0.05,
SLR analysis). Only 1% and 3% of the recorded neurons were
modulated by both the factors stimulus intensity and the sub-
jec ve decision during the stimulus and delay phase, respectively
(Fig. 2B). Neurons significantly covarying with the monkey’s
choices were termed “decision neurons.” Overall, we found
a significantly higher proportion of decision neurons in the delay
phase compared with the stimulus phase, (P < 0.01; χ2 test).
Receiver operating characteristics (ROC) analysis was used to
qua tify the probability with which the deci ion of the monkey
could be predicted from the neuronal responses. Choice proba-
bility indices were calculated for “yes” decisions in clearly visible,
salient stimulus trials (hits) versus “no” decisions in stimulus-
absent trials (correct rejections), as well as for “yes” (hits) versus
“no” (misses) decisions in threshold trials when stimuli were
presented clos to the perceptual threshold.
Neuronal selectivity of a given neuron is usually determined
by the experimental condition that elicits the highest discharge
rate. This approach ignores that suppressive effects (decreases in
firing rates relative to baseline discharge) are sometimes the
dominant influences of a particular stimulus. Thus, we sub-
divided and classified decision neurons according to their active
modulation of neuronal activity (modulation strength) during
“yes” or “no” decisions rather than highest discharge rate.
Neurons modulating (increasing or decreasing) their firing rates
more strongly for “yes” decisions were termed “yes” neurons,
cells modulati their discharges more strongly to “no” decision
were called “no” neurons.
“Yes” Neurons Actively Encode Decisions During the Stimulus Phase.
During the stimulus phase, virtually all decision neurons (98%)
modulated their discharge rates only for “yes” judgments (merely
one neuron was classifie as a “no” cell; summary in Table S1).
Fig. 3A shows an exemplary “yes” cell that increased its discharge
rates for hits in salient stimulus trials, whereas the firing rates for
correct rejections in stimulus-absent trials remained at baseline
level. Neuronal responses for threshold trials correlated signifi-
cantly with the judgment of the monkey: for “yes” decisions,
neurons increased their activity, mirroring the firing rate in salient
stimulus trials. For erroneous “no” deci ions (misses), activity
remained at baseline level, just as in stimulus absent trials. The
choice probability indices for salient and threshold trials are
depicted as a function of time in Fig. 3A, Lower. Indices signifi-
cantly above chance level indicate that these discharges of neu-
rons reliably predict the decision of the monkey (P < 0.05; ROC
analysis, bootstrapping). This effect was also present on the
neuron l population l vel (34 cel s; Fig. 3B). Several cells showed
transient suppression of the firing rate for “yes” decisions (Fig.
3C); the neuronal population data (23 units) are depicted in Fig.
3D. The population analysis includes the neuronal responses
during false alarms. Interestingly, decision neurons increased
(Fig. 3B) or decreased (Fig. 3D) the firing rates for this erroneous
“yes” decisions in a similar way as during hit trials, already during
this early decision phase. The average peak latencies of the neu-
ronal responses for false alarms and hits were comparable (neu-
rons increasing the firing rate: hit latency = 242 ms, false alarms
latency = 289 ms; neurons decreasing firing rates: hit latency =
346 ms, false alarms latency = 341 ms). Overall, during the
stimulus phase, PFC neurons represe ted “y ” decisions by ei-
ther increasing or decre sing their responses, wher s “no”
decisions were represented by default discharge rates.
Fig. 1. Visual detection protocol and behavioral performance. (A) The
monkeys initiated each experimental trial by grasping a lever and fixating
central fixatio rget. After 500 ms, a stimulus was displayed for 100 ms in
50% of the trials (intensity varied in nine levels, centered arou d the per-
ceptual threshold). In the other 50% of the trials, no stimulus was shown.
Both types of trials appeared randomly. After the delay period (2,700 ms),
a color cue appeared to indicate the rule of how to respond to a particular
decision. If a stimulus was presented, a red square cue required the monkey
to release the lever within 1,000 ms t receive a fluid rew rd, whereas a blue
cue demand d he monkey to keep holding the lever for another 1,200 ms.
The rule applied in the inverse way if no stimulus was presented. Thus,
movement preparation was excluded during the delay period. (B) Signal
detection theory classifies an observer’s behavioral options (hit, miss, correct
rejection, and false alarms) at detection threshold, given two stimulus con-
ditions (stimulus present or absent) and two possible decisions (“yes, stim-
ulus present” and “no, stimulus absent”). (C and D) Psychometric detection
curve for monkey H (C) and monkey M (D). Stimulus intensity is represented
as % visual contrast; visual contrast of 0 indicates absence of stimulus. [Error
bars (SEM) are so small that they are hidden behind the markers].
Fig. 2. Recording sites and proportion of selective cells. (A) Right shows
a top view of a monkey brain. The gray area marks the chamber location.
The circular panels on Left show the precise rec r ing sites inside each re-
cording chamber in the lateral PFC for both keys. The prop rti n f
decision neurons at individual recording sites is color-coded. iar, inferior
arcuate sulcus; ps, principal sulcus; sar, superior arcuate sulcus. (B) Pro-
portions of neurons coding stimulus intensity and decision in both phases.
2 of 6 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1121084109 Merten and Nieder
“Yes” and “No” Neurons Actively Encode Decisions During th Delay
Phase. I striking contrast to the findings in the sample phase, the
processing of decisions in the delay phase was based on “yes”
(Fig. 4 A and B) as well as active “no” responses (Fig. 4 C and D)
(summary in Table S1). Just as in the stimulus phase, we found
neurons increasing (79 neurons; Fig. 4B) or decreasing (25 units)
their firing rates for “yes” decisions (hits and false alarms). In
addition, however, a new class of decision cells, “no” neurons,
exhibited significantly increased discharge rates whenever the
monk y decided to report the absence of a stimulus (correct
rejections and misses) (Fig. 4C; average responses of 21 neurons
in Fig. 4D). Three cells were classified as decreasing their firing
rate for “no” responses. These active “no” neurons represent an
abstract category that is neither generated by a specific input nor
linked to a preparation of a motor response.
Finally, we als inves igated the neur nal s lectivity of delay
phase decision neurons to the rule cue and the instructed motor
action during the rule cue phase. For both “yes” and “no” decision
neurons, decision activity remained the dominant factor well into
the rule cue phase (Fig. 5 A and B). To identify the proportions of
decision neurons responding to decision, stimulus intensity, rule
cue, and moto action during the cue p esentation, we next per-
formed a sliding SLR analysis by using these factors (Fig. 5C).
Selectivity for the color cu or the motor action was absent during
the delay analysis period. Only after a latency of ≈100 ms after
rule cue onset, deci ion cells tar ed to encode the color of the
rule cue and, most dominantly, the instruct d motor action.
Discussion
We found single neurons in the PFC that encode abstract “yes”
and “no” decisions during a visual detection task. In this percep-
tual decision task that dissociated the decision both from low-level
sensory processing and preparatory motor activity, the neuronal
activity covaried wit the subj ctive reports of monkeys about the
percepts. A very small proportion of decision neurons showed an
additional significant effect of the intensity of the visual stimulus;
thus, we report a predominantly categorical, binary activation
patte n of “yes” or “no” decision coding. During the stimulus
phase, decision neurons exclusively either increased or decreased
their firing rates for “yes” decisions, whereas “no” responses were
represented by baseline discharge rates. During the delay period,
howev r, neurons also actively encoded “no” decisions. We pro-
pose that the coding of abstract, report-independ nt decisions is
fundamentally simila to the represe tation f abstract categories
(21), even if one choic alternative s devoid of se so y vidence.
Our data thus extend previous findings about the representat on of
perceptual decisions in d tection tasks (12).
Behavioral Relevance of the Perce tual Decision Encoding. Decision
neurons modulated their firing rates according to the sensory
percept of monkeys: Activity signaling categorical “yes” decisions
(hits and false alarms) was different from neuronal responses to
correct rejections a d misses (as shown by SLR analysis). The
Fig. 3. Decision coding by “yes” neurons during the stimulus phase. (A and
C) Responses of two example neurons coding the “yes” decision by in-
creasing (A) or decreasing (C) their firing rates during the sti ulus phase
(analysis window highlighte by the gray shaded area). Topdepict d t raster
plots; Middle represent the corresponding spike density histograms aver-
aged and smoothed with a Gaussian kernel for illustration. The vertical black
lines indicate the presentation of the stimulus (at 500 ms) and the rule cue
(at 3,300 ms). Stimulus duration is marked by a small horizontal bar un-
derneath the x axis of each plot. Bottom show the choic pr bability indices
as a function of time. Dott d lines mark significance levels. (B and D) Av-
eraged and normalized responses (SI Materials and Methods) and choice
probability indices of decision neurons grouped by response type. Shaded
regions indicate SEM; n, number of neurons.
Fig. 4. Decision co ing by “yes” and “ o” neurons during the delay phase.
(A and C) Raster plots, spike de sity functions, and ch ice probability indices
for neurons increasing their activity for “yes” decisions (A) or for “no” deci-
sions (C) during the delay phase. (B and D) Normalized averaged responses (SI
Materials and Methods) of the corresp nding groups. Active “no” decisi
neurons newly emerged during the delay phase. Same layout as in Fig. 3.
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Figure 5. Experimental paradigm and sample results reproduced from Merten and Nieder [34]. The left-hand panel
shows the experimental paradigm used to study decisions about stimulus abs nce and presence after controlling for
sensory and motor features of the response. The monkeys initiated each trial by grasping a lever and fixating a
central fixation target. A low-contrast stimulus was then displayed for 100ms (on 50% of trials) or a blank screen was
maintained (on the other 50% of trials). After a short delay, the respon e map i gs for th t trial were revealed ( n
some trials a present decision would requir lever release, w reas on other trial the ame decision would requir
a lever hold). The right-hand panel shows that firing rates of neural populations in LPFC tracked abstract decisions
abou presence or abs nce before the motor mapping was known, and did so independently of stimulus properties
(similar activations were s en for hits and false alarms, and for misses an corre t rej ti ns).
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5.1 Role of disambiguating cues in resolving states of awareness
A higher-order awareness state is both partially observable (with respect to sensory input) and highly abstract [40].
Consider the following thought experiment in which we set up two conditions in a dark room, one in which the subject
has their eyes open and one in which they have their eyes closed. Now imagine that we have arranged for neural
activity in early visual areas to be identical in the two cases (the X’s are the same), and that in both cases the subject is
told (for instance via an auditory cue) that there might have been a faint flash of light. Despite the visual activity being
identical, the subject can be sure that they didn’t see anything when their eyes were closed compared to when they were
open. In other words, whether our eyes are open or not provides disambiguating information as to the current state of
awareness. Other disambiguating cues such as beliefs about the state of attention or other properties of the sensory
system presumably also provide important, low-dimensional cues as to the state of awareness [41]. Computationally
this may be implemented as beliefs about precision (priors on Σ in the model in Figure 2A), where precision refers to
the inverse of the noise (variability) we expect from a particular sensory channel.
One straightforward way of introducing this relationship is to allow precision itself to depend on awareness (a con-
nection between A and Σ in Figure 1A. Such a modification implies that an awareness state may be two-dimensional,
encoding the distinction between whether something has the potential to be seen (high vs. low expected precision)
as well as whether something is seen (present vs. absent; [42, 43]). This aspect of the HOSS model is also in keep-
ing with Graziano’s attention schema model of consciousness, in which awareness is equated to a model of attention
[23]. However, in contrast to the attention schema, in HOSS a model of attention would provide a critical input into
resolving ambiguity about whether we are aware or not (by affecting beliefs about precision), rather than determining
awareness itself.
6 Relationship to other theories of consciousness
The goal of the higher-order state-space (HOSS) approach outlined here is modest - to delineate computations sup-
porting metacognitive reports about awareness. This is reasonable given that report (or the potential for report) is the
starting point for a scientific study of consciousness.
A stronger reading of the model is that conscious experience and metacognitive reports depend on shared mechanisms
[44, 45]. This stronger version shares many similarities with higher-order theories of consciousness, particularly Lau’s
proposal that consciousness involves “signal detection on the mind” [41]. Notably, a process of hierarchical inference
may take place via passive message-passing without any strategic, cognitive access to this information e.g. in working
memory [46], and is therefore compatible with higher-order representational accounts of phenomenal consciousness
[47].
In HOSS, the higher-order awareness state is simple and low-dimensional. Lower-order states clearly must make a
contribution to perceptual content under this arrangement – a variant of the “joint determination” view advocated by
Lau and Brown [48]. However it seems to us an empirical question as to the relative granularity of higher-order and
first-order representations in terms of their contribution to conscious experience, and a range of intermediate views are
plausible. The more important point is that the state space is factorised to allow two separate causes of the sensory
data – what it is, and whether I have seen it. In other words, becoming aware of a red, tilted object may depend on
learning an abstract, factorised state of presence/absence that is not bound up with the states of being red or tilted.
HOSS also provides a new perspective on global workspace (GWS) architectures. GWS proposes that consciousness
occurs when information is “globally broadcast” throughout the brain. As a result of global broadcast, cognitive
and linguistic machinery have access to information about a particular stimulus or subpersonal mental state. GWS
theory accounts for ignition responses on present vs. absent trials by positing that workspace neurons with long-range
connections are only activated during global broadcast [49].
HOSS retains the “global” aspect of GWS, in that an awareness state is hierarchically higher with respect to the range
of possible perceptual states, and therefore has a wider conceptual (and presumably temporal) purview. However,
HOSS recasts ignition-like activations as asymmetric inference about stimulus presence rather than a consequence of
stimulus content being “broadcast”. In any case, it is arguable whether such global broadcast is able to directly account
for how a system claims to be conscious of a stimulus without positing additional machinery. Global access to the
workspace would allow the system to say “there is an X”, but not endow it with the capacity to report awareness of X.
This point is made concisely by Graziano [50]:
Consider asking ‘Are you aware of the apple?’ The search engine searches the internal model
and finds no answer. It finds information about an apple, but no information about what ‘awareness’
is, or whether it has any of it... It cannot answer the question. It does not compute in this domain.
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The state space approach outlined here is designed explicitly to compute in this domain, and therefore does not suf-
fer from the same problem. Another critical difference between GWS and HOSS is that HOSS predicts prefrontal
involvement for active decisions about stimulus absence, whereas GWS predicts that PFC remains quiescent on such
trials due to a failure of the stimulus to gain access to the workspace.
Finally, to the extent that abstract awareness states need to be learnt, or constructed, they may emerge during a pro-
tracted period of development. Such development would begin with creating a perceptual generative model (W ) before
a more general property (awareness) could be abstracted from these perceptual states. This is consistent with Cleere-
mans’ “radical plasticity thesis” in which consciousness is underpinned by learning abstract representations of both
ourselves and the world [51].
7 Research questions
I close with questions for future research motivated by the current computational sketch:
1. How are awareness states represented in neural activity? Are presence and absence encoded symmetrically?
2. Is a (neural) representation of awareness encoded separately from other aspects of perceptual content?
3. How are awareness states learned?
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